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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANN B. HOPK I NS,
Pla inti ff,
v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE,
Def enda nt.
__ __ __ __ __ __
__ __ __

)
)
)
)
)

Civ il Acti on No . 84-3 040
(GAG )

)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT'S POST-TRIAL
BRIEF ON REMEDIAL ISSUES
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Def enda nt Pric e Wat erho use is ent itle d to
judg men t in
this case beca use its dec isio n in 1983 to
defe r pla inti ff's
part ners hip cand idac y was inde pen den tly pred
icat ed upon
pla inti ff's cond uct quit e apa rt from any
con side rati on of her
gend er. How ever , if the Cou rt find s for
pla inti ff on
liab ilit y, for the foll owi ng reas ons the
judg men t in her favo r
shou ld be lim ited to no more than back pay
in an amo unt equ al
to the diff eren ce betw een the inco me of a
begi nnin g Pric e
Wat erho use part ner and the amo unt pla inti
ff actu ally earn ed for
the peri od July 1, 1983 thro ugh June 30,
1984 :

1.

Pla inti ff is not ent itle d to a jud icia lly
impo sed
part ners hip in the Pric e Wat erho use firm .
(a)

The Cou rt has no auth orit y unde r Titl e VII
to crea te a part ners hip by jud icia l decr ee;
and

(b)

This is not an appropria te case for an

equitable decree mandating a partnersh ip because:
(i)

Due to deficienc ies in her

interperso nal skills, plaintiff was not and
is not qualified to be a Price Waterhous e
partner;
(ii)

Plaintiff is not qualified

technical ly to be a Price Waterhous e partner
and has made no showing that a suitable
position is available for her in the
Washingto n, D.C. managemen t consulting
practice of the Price Waterhous e firm; and
(iii)

A partnersh ip in a

professio nal, collegial firm is an
inappropr iate equitable remedy because the
Court is not in a position to determine
where and under what circumsta nces plaintiff
should be made a partner or to supervise
that intensely personal, intimate and
ongoing relationsh ip.
2.

If the Court finds in favor of plaintiff on

liability , she is entitled to back pay of no more than one
year's different ial between what she would have earned and what
she did earn because:

-

2 -

(a)

Plaintiff made a deliberate and conscious

decision to commence her own business in January of 1984 and to
commit herself to that enterprise for several years thereafter.
(b)

Plaintiff was qualified for and, with

reasonable efforts, could have obtained employment comparable
in earning potential and in her field to the position to which
she aspired at Price Waterhouse.

She failed to make any

reasonable efforts to seek such employment at major accounting
firms or at any of the many other consulting firms that did
work in her field.

She failed adequately to consult with or

employ executive placement firms or to seek comparable
employment outside Washington.

Plaintiff's decision to

initiate and operate her own firm was not a reasonable effort
to mitigate damages.

Had she made reasonable efforts, she

would have secured a comparable position in the ten months
between the time she was told she would not be reproposed for
partner and June 30, 1984.
3.

Plaintiff is not entitled to a front pay award

and her calculations as to the amount of front pay to which she
is entitled are unsupportabl e and speculative.
(a)

Plaintiff could certainly have obtained

employment comparable to the partnership she did not attain at
Price Waterhouse in the seven years since she was told of the
decision not to repropose her for partnership.

There were many

comparable positions available in a field that was expanding
explosively and it is entirely unreasonable to assume, as

-

3 -

plaintiff has done, that Price Waterhouse is the only available
opportunity for her to receive compensation at the level to
which she aspires.
(b)

It is entirely too specul~tive to award

plaintiff front pay based upon a Price Waterhouse partnership
because plaintiff has not established:
(i)

That she would have

remained a Price Waterhouse partner even if
she had been advanced to partnership in 1983;
(ii)

That a Price Waterhouse

partner would have earned the amounts
plaintiff asks this Court to assume.
4.

Other injunctive relief is not warranted.

Plaintiff has not shown that such relief is necessary.

The

evidence shows that Price Waterhouse took immediate and
effective measures to respond fully and faithfully to this
Court Is previous opinio~regarding its partnership- selection
practices.
'----.

I

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO NO RELIEF
BECAUSE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE RENDERED FOR
PRICE WATERHOUSE ON LIABILITY

The "judgment against Price Waterhouse on liability"
was reversed by the Supreme Court and remanded to the Court of
Appeals "for further proceedings."
Hopkiris, 109

s.

Price Waterhouse v.

Ct. 1775, 1795 (1989).

\

-

4 -

The Court of Appeals

'•

acc ord ing ly vac ate d its 198 7 man date
as wel l as the pre vio us
judg men t of the Dis tric t Cou rt and
rem and ed the cas e to the
Dis tric t Cou rt "fo r fur the r pro cee din
gs." Aug ust l, 198 9 Ord er.
The fur the r pro cee din gs to be con duc
ted by thi s Cou rt
req uir e de nov o con sid era tion of the
que stio n of the
def end ant 's lia bil ity dep end ing upo
n whe ther it wou ld hav e made
the sam e emp loym ent dec isio n irre spe
ctiv e of pla int iff 's
gen der . Onl y if the Cou rt find s in
fav or of pla int iff on
lia bil ity wil l it be nec ess ary for
the Cou rt to pro cee d to make
find ing s and ren der a judg men t as to
the app rop riat e rem edy .
The lia bil ity pha se has bee n bri efe
d sep ara tely on
rem and . As dem ons trat ed at len gth
in tha t ma teri al, the re is
an abu nda nce of evi den ce tha t est abl
ish es tha t the pla int iff 's
can did acy for par tne rsh ip wou ld hav
e bee n def erre d for one yea r
irre spe ctiv e of her gen der . Pla int
iff 's "co ndu ct," not her
gen der , "pr ovi ded amp le jus tifi cat ion
for the com pla ints tha t
form ed the bas is of the Pol icy Boa rd's
dec isio n." Hop kins v.
Pri ce Wa terh ous e, 618 F. Sup p. 110 9,
111 4 (D.D .C. 198 5)
(em pha sis add ed) . Pla int iff rec eiv ed
mor e "no " vot es in the
par tne rsh ip sel ect ion pro ces s tha n
85 of the oth er 88
can did ate s. The wei ght giv en by Pri
ce Wa terh ous e to neg ativ e
com men ts was not dis crim ina tory . .Id,
at 111 6. And "Pr ice
Wa terh ous e had leg itim ate , non dis crim
ina tory rea son s for
dis ting uis hin g betw een the pla int iff
and the mal e par tne rs wit h
whom she com par e(d ] her sel f." .Id,
at 111 5. The refo re, unl ess
the Cou rt det erm ine s to giv e no wei
ght at all to the com pla ints

-
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about or object ions to plaint iff' s "condu ct" by over two -t hirds
of t he partne rs who evalua ted her, concer ns that were
"clear (ly] . . . not fabrica ted" (Id. at 1114; emphas is added) ,
it is eviden t that plaint iff's partne rship candid acy would have
receive d no more than a deferr al recomm endatio n in 1983. "The
partne rs genera lly believ e that Ann had a problem on
interpe rsonal skills and that as a result she was evalua ted
evenha ndedly

ff

Testim ony of Joseph E . Connor , 1990

Tr. a t 249.
Plaint iff has been unable to deny that she had seriou s
problem s with her interpe rsonal skills that existed quite apart
from any sexual stereot yping or tainted judgme nts by any of her
evalua tors.

She and even her suppor ters on the staff

acknow ledged these shortco mings.

618 F. Supp. at 1114.

These

precis e qualit ies consti tuted "a legitim ate, nondis crimin atory
reason for refusin g to admit [plain tiff] to partne rship."

Id.

Theref ore, judgme nt should be rendere d for Price Waterh ouse on
liabil ity and no remedy is warran ted.

II
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCHARGED
This Court determ ined, based upon a carefu l review of
the eviden ce, that the decisio n not to repropo se plaint iff for
partne r in August 1983 was the result of positio ns taken by two
Price Waterh ouse partne rs. With respec t to those partne rs, the
Court found, as to one, that there was

-
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"D..Q.

proof that his

position was animated by animosi ty toward [plaint iff's] sex"
and, as to the other, the Court found that he was "a credible
witness" and "accept[ ed]" his testimon y that his decision was
based upon "additio nal criticis m of [plaint iff's] managem ent
style from staff members , having several convers ations with the
plainti ff, and reflecti ng on his previous experien ce with her
work."

618 F. Supp. at 1114 (emphas is added).

Thus, the Court

determin ed that the "decisio n not to repropos e was due to the
unexpec ted position taken by the two partners . . . and
plainti ff has not proven that their actions were
discrim inatory. "

Id. at 1115.

This finding was not appealed

and must be consider ed the law of the case.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals did conside r
this Court's conclusi on that plainti ff had not been
constru ctively discharg ed.

Plainti ff contende d, inter alia,

that the constru ctive discharg e doctrine was not germane to
decision s involvin g partners hip tenure.

"[S]ocie ty derives no

value from requirin g such individu als to stay [where] they are
simply to pursue a Title VII claim."
Appella nt-Cross Appellee at 16.

Origina l Br. of

Plainti ff contende d that "the

relevan t inquiry is mitigati on of damages , which is far
differen t than entitlem ent to relief RU

.u. .

[T]he fact

that plainti ff left Price Waterho use may have a bearing on the
precise amount of relief owed her, but not on her right to
relief in the first instance ."

-

.Id, at 17.

7 -

Altering the law of constructive discharge in this
Circuit, the Court of Appeals reversed this Court's decision on
constructive discharge, holding that Price Waterhouse's tainted
"decision to deny . . . partnership status, . . . coupled with"
the nondiscriminatory decision not to renominate "amounted to a
constructive discharge."

Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d

458, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Operating under the logical and

legally sound assumption that a reversal of the decision on
liability would vitiate the rulings on remedial issues, Price
Waterhouse did not seek certiorari on the constructive
discharge holding of the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff now takes the position that it is the law of
the case that plaintiff was constructively discharged and that,
if so, "assuming liability, plaintiff is entitled to relief."
Pl. Post-Trial Brief On Relief Issues (filed April 13, 1990)
("Pl. Br.") at 1.

Plaintiff also apparently contends that if

she was constructively discharged, she is 1™ facto entitled
to a partnership .

.Id at 2.

Defendant will demonstrate in this portion of the
brief the validity of the following points:
1.

The decision of the Court of Appeals with respect

to constructive discharge has been vacated and is not the law
of the case.
2.

The decision of the Court of Appeals with respect

to constructive discharge was predicated upon a finding of

-
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liability that has been vacated.

A remedial finding predicated

upon a vacated finding of liability should not and cannot be
the law of the case.
3.

The law of the case doctrine should not apply to

the constructive discharge ruling because that ruling creates
an anomaly with the unappealed finding that the decision not to
repropose was nondiscrimin atory, which is equally entitled to
be considered the law of the case.

It would be awkward and

unfair to apply the law of the case doctrine to the
constructive discharge holding under such circumstance s.
4.

If the constructive discharge decision and the

finding of a nondiscrimin atory decision not to repropose are
both the law of this case, and either both or neither must be,
then the constructive discharge decision is relevant, as
plaintiff contended in the Court of Appeals, only as to
mitigation of damages and the amount of relief to which she is
entitled.

The constructive discharge holding, even if

considered in isolation, means only that plaintiff's
resignation from the firm does not in and of itself terminate
plaintiff's claim for relief.

Plaintiff's resignation

therefore remains a factor to be considered in determining the
reasonablene ss of plaintiff's efforts to minimize her losses
after the 1983 hold decision.

Moreover, as demonstrated in

Part III of this brief, there were many opportunitie s available
to plaintiff to mitigate her damages; her departure from Price

-
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Waterhouse, whether or not a constructive discharge, did not in
any way diminish the alternatives available to her.
A.

The Law of the Case Doctrine

The "law of the case is an amorphous concept."
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983).

"As most

commonly defined, the doctrine posits that when a court decides
upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the
same issues in subsequent stages in the same case."
However, the doctrine is not immutable.

s.e..e

.Id.

Safir v. ~ ' 718

F.2d 475, 481 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Application of the
doctrine is in any event discretionary . . . . "),cert.denied,
467 U.S. 1206 (1984).

For example, when there "has been a

change in the factual matrix in which the first decision was
rendered," courts will depart from a previous decision of a
question of law.

lB J. Moore, J. Lucas,

&

T. Currier, Moore's

Federal Practice, 0.404(4-6], at 146-47 (2d ed. 1988)
("Moore's Federal Practice").

Other factors, such as "the

alternative and hence unnecessary character of an original
pronouncement," also have been thought to "justify a departure
from the usual principles of law of the case.•

Halperin v.

Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.).
The "mandate rule" is a "specific application" of the
law of the case doctrine, which articulates the general
proposition that a "lower court is bound by the mandate of a
federal appellate court as the law of the case and, generally,

- 10 -

is without power to reconsider issues decided on a previous
appeal."

Maggard v. O'Connell, 703 F.2d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir.

1983); see also City of Cleveland v. Federal Power Commission,
561 F.2d 344, 346-47 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

However, the "law of

the case does not apply to a finding that is later vacated."
Dorsey v. Continental Casualty Co., 730 F.2d 675, 678 (11th
Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original).
B.

The Court of Appeals vacated Its Own Mandate.
Judgment And Opinion.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals'
judgment against Price Waterhouse on liability and remanded the
case to that Court for further proceedings.
v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795 (1989).

Price Waterhouse
The Court of Appeals

on remand issued an order vacating both its 1987 "mandate" and
the judgment of this Court and remanded the case to this Court
for "further proceedings. "

August 1, 1989 Order.

Prior to the trial on remand, and even during the
trial, plaintiff conceded that the Court of Appeals had vacated
its 1987 opinion:

"We recognize that [the Court of Appeals']

opinion was vacated following the Supreme Court's

•

decision.
17, 1990).

~

Pl. Pretrial Br. On Remedy, at 5 (filed Jan.

.a..l.a.o. 1990 Tr. at 86 ("we think that [the Court

of Appeals' decision] had be[en] vacated.").

Plaintiff has

reversed course, however, and now argues that "[w]hile the
Court of Appeals vacated its own mandate, its opinion on
constructive discharge remains the law of the case."

- 11 -

Pl. Br.

at 4. 11

However, plaintiff was correct the first time.

In

this Circuit, the "mandate" of the Court of Appeals "consist[s]
of . . . the Court's opinion and judgment."

City of Cleveland

v. Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344, 347 n.25 {D.C. Cir.
1977) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4l(a));

™' ~ ,

Johnson v.

Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 801 F.2d 412, 415 {D.C.
Cir. 1986) (the opinion and judgment constitute the mandate of
the Court of Appeals) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4l(a)).

Indeed,

the Court of Appeals' internal operating procedures expressly
provide:

"This Circuit does not utilize a formal document

called a mandate.

Rather the Clerk issues a certified copy of

the judgment and the opinion . . . of the Court in lieu of
mandate.

The rules and the Court's orders refer to that
document as 'the mandate.'" 11

l/ Had defendant been aware in the fall of 1989 when decisions
were being made with respect to whether to reopen the
evidentiary phase of the liability portion of this trial that
plaintiff would argue that the Court of Appeals' constructive
discharge decision was binding as the law of the case,
defendant undoubtedly would have sought to avail itself of the
opportunity to introduce additional evidence relating to the
1983 hold decision and its effects, if any, on plaintiff's
prospects for reproposal the following year and on her decision
to resign from the firm. However, at the time, as noted above,
plaintiff was agreeing with defendant that the constructive
discharge opinion had been vacated. At this late date,
plaintiff should not be permitted to undercut defendant's
justifiable reliance on plaintiff's litigation position in this
case. S i l ~ infra note 7.

11

Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures, United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, XII (2)
{Aug. 1, 1987) {emphasis added). This practice is expressly
[Footnote continued on next page]
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In December 1987 the Court of Appeals transmitte d to
this Court its "mandate, " i.e., its judgment and opinion of
August 4, 1987.~/

This mandate, i.e., the opinion and

judgment of August 4, 1987, was vacated by the Court of
Appeals' August 1, 1989 Order.
Once the Court of Appeals vacated its August 4 , 1987
opinion, that opinion lost any precedent ial and binding effect
it might have had at a later stage in the proceedin gs.
O'Connor v. Donaldson , 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975); Johnson
v. Board of Education , 457 U.S. 52 (1982);

~ _g_il.Q.

Pl. Br.

at 4 (the law of the case "doctrine does not apply to findings
that are 'integral ' to a vacated judgment of the higher court")
(citation omitted). !/

~/

[Footnote continued from previous page]

authorized by Rule 4l(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure , which provides: "A certified copy of the judgment
and a copy of the opinion of the court, if any, and any
direction as to costs shall constitut e .t.M mandate, unless the
court directs that a formal mandate issue." (emphasis added).
l/ Letter from George A. Fisher to James F. Davey (Dec. 8,
1987) ("Pursuan t to . . . Rule 4l(a) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure , transmitte d herewith, in lieu of formal
mandate, is a copy of this Court's Opinion and a certified copy
of the Judgment, both filed August 4, 1987.").

!/ Although plaintiff makes much of the fact that the Supreme
Court "left undisturbe d the Court of Appeals' findings and
conclusio ns on relief," Pl. Br. at 4, she does not claim that
any of the opinions by the Justices addressed the merits of
remedial issues. ~ i,d. at 3 ("The Supreme Court took pains
not to decide, disapprov e or even discuss the Court of Appeals'
ruling on construct ive discharge ."). The plurality opinion
expressly stated that "[w]e are concerned today .o.n.lY with Price
Waterhous e's decision to place Hopkins' candidacy Q1l h.Q.lg_."
109 s. Ct. at 1781 n.l (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' August 1989 Order
on remand does not define or limit the scope of the "further
proceedings" to be conducted or the issues to be decided.~/
And this Court is free to decide any issue not foreclosed by
the directives of the Court of Appeals, including remedial
issues such as the effect of plaintiff ' s resignation from Price
Waterhouse on the issue of appropriate relief.

See,~,

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979) {"'While a
mandate is controlling as to matters within its compass, on the
remand a lower court is free as to other issues.'") {citation
omitted); Moore's Federal Practice,

,r

0.404(10], at 172-73

{"When the remand is general . . . the district court is free
to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate.").

c.

The Decision of The court of Appeals With Respect
To constructive Discharge Is A Remedial Ruling
That Was Predicated On A Finding Of Liability
That Has Been Reversed And vacated.

The Court of Appeals' constructive discharge holding
was a remedial ruling only and was predicated on a finding of
Title VII liability that has been reversed by the Supreme
Court.

The reversal of the judgment against Price Waterhouse

on liability requires a fresh determinatio n of the effect of
plaintiff's resignation on the issue of appropriate relief.

2/ When the Court of Appeals vacated its 1987 "mandate," which
had reversed this Court's ruling on constructive discharge and
ordered this Court to conduct remedial proceedings in light of
that holding, it ·necessarily reopened the full panoply of
remedial issues presented.
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Plaintiff has contended throughout these and related
proceedings that the liability and remedial issues in this case
are intimately related.

In her amended EEOC complaint~/ and

her complaint in this case, plaintiff advanced a separate cause
of action for "retaliation ," "harassment" and "constructiv e
discharge" premised on Price Waterhouse's treatment of her
after the 1983 decision to defer her partnership candidacy.
Plaintiff withdrew this claim before trial.l/
139;

~

618 F. Supp. at 1121.

1985 Tr. at

Instead, plaintiff argued that

the "refusal to re-propose plaintiff for partner .

and

. the firm's earlier decision to place her on hold are.
closely related and are part of a continuing process," and
contended that both decisions violated Title VII.
Post-Trial Br. at

30

(1985).

Plaintiff's

But this Court expressly rejected

plaintiff's contention that the second decision violated Title
VII and plaintiff did not pursue that issue on appeal.

~/

Def. Ex. 57.

1/ The only reference to constructive discharge in the briefs
submitted in the District Court during the first trial is the
statement in footnote 1 of Defendant's Post-Trial Brief (1985)
in which Price Waterhouse noted that plaintiff's resignation
cut off her remedial rights because plaintiff had withdrawn her
claim of constructive discharge. Plaintiff responded that
Price Waterhouse was "invit[ing] this Court to prejudge and
wrongly limit the relief to be given plaintiff," but did not
mention constructive discharge, and, indeed, appeared to reject
the applicability in partnership cases of the doctrine's basic
premise that a Title VII plaintiff "must continue to work for
[the defendant] or else forfeit her remedies . . . until she
can secure a final favorable court judgment." Pl. Post-Trial
Reply Br. at 12 n.8 (1985). ~~supr a page 7.
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The Cour t of Appe als' reme dial rulin g on cons truct
ive
disch arge was intim ately boun d up with its dete rmin
ation of
Title VII liab ility .

See 825 F.2d at 463, 473.

It was

pred icate d on a fact- base d inqu iry into the circu msta
nces and
effe ct of the alleg ed Title VII viol ation -- the 1983
hold
deci sion -- and that findi ng of liab ility has been
reve rsed.
In this cont ext, it is nece ssary for the Cour t to
revi ew~
novo all the facts rela tive to an appr opria te reme
dy in ligh t
of the enti re reco rd on rema nd.
The Supre me Cour t has recog nized that a part ial new
tria l is perm issib le only wher e it "cle arly appe ars
that the
issue to be retri ed is so disti nct and sepa rate from
the othe rs
that a tria l of it alon e may be had with out inju stice
."
Gaso line Prod ucts co, v. Cham plin Refi ning co,, 283

u.s.

494,

500 (193 1).

Thus , in Gaso line Prod ucts. the Cour t reve rsed the
Firs t Circ uit's deci sion rema nding a case for a new
tria l
limit ed to the issue of dama ges and orde red a new tria
l as to
"all of the issue s raise d" beca use "the ques tion of
dama ges

. is so inter wove n with that of liab ility that the
form er cann ot be subm itted to the jury inde pend ently
of the

latte r with out conf usiqn and unce rtain ty, whic h amou
nt to a
deni al of a fair tria l." l_d. 500- 01; ~ , ~ , Cam

alier &

Buck ley-M adiso n. Inc, v. Madi son Hote l. Inc. , 513 F.2d
407,
420-2 1 (D.C . Cir. 1975 ) (reve rsing on issue of liab
ility alone
but orde ring new tria l on both liab ility and dama ges
beca use,
"a new tria l may be limit ed to less than all of the
issue s
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raised in the case " only where "error . . . leaves the verdict
on completely separate issues uninfecte d");~~ Turner v.
Johnson

&

Johnson, 809 F.2d 90, 103 n.13 (1st Cir. 1986).
D.

There Are Inconsistenc ies Between The
Constructive Discharge Ruling And The Unappealed
Finding That the Decision Not To Repropose Was
Nondiscrimin atory.

The Court of Appeals' ruling with respect to
constructive discharge presents a confusing anomaly when
juxtaposed with this Court's unappealed ruling that the OGS
decision not to repropose plaintiff for partnership was not
discriminato ry.

This appar ent inconsistenc y is undoubtedly the

cause of the confusion that has mystified both this Court and
the litigants in attempting to rationalize the Court of
Appeals' decision.
The evidentiary record plainly supports this Court's
conclusion that plaintiff's own conduct contributed
significantl y to the OGS decision not to repropose her for
partnership.

1985 Tr. at 387-88, 410-11.

After the 1983

decision to defer her partnership candidacy, plaintiff
mischaracter ized to an OGS partner the nature and substance of
a conversation she had had with the Chairman and Senior Partner
of Price Waterhouse, Joseph E. Connor, regarding her prospects
at the firm.

Her conduct was perceived as an effort to

"intimidate" other partners to support her partnership
candidacy in 1984.

~

1985 Tr. at 387-88, 410-11.

This

incident, and other factors, not any sex-based animus, led the
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partner, who had supported plaintiff's 1983 candidacy, to
withdraw his support of plaintiff's 1984 partnership
candidacy.~/

The decision of this partner and another

partner to oppose plaintiff's candidacy resulted in the
decision not to renominate plaintiff for partnership in 1984.
618 F. Supp. at 1115.

The Court carefully and thoroughly

evaluated this evidence and reached the conclusion, which
plaintiff did not even challenge on appeal, that the decision
not to repropose was not discriminatory.
The Court of Appeals agreed with this Court that the
"mere fact of discrimination, without more"

{825

F.2d at 473)

is insufficient to make out a claim of constructive discharge.
However, the Court of Appeals held that the act of
discrimination to defer plaintiff's partnership candidacy,
"coupled" with the nondiscriminatory failure to renominate
"would have been viewed . . . as a career-ending action" and
therefore amounted to a constructive discharge .

.Id,

The

anomaly created by these unusual and somewhat inconsistent
conclusions makes it awkward and unjust to apply the law of the
case doctrine to the constructive discharge decision.
Therefore, the "'good sense and wise judicial practice' that
informs the law-of-the-case doctrine," Halperin. 807 F.2d at

~/ This partner testified to other difficulties that he
encountered with plaintiff after the hold decision involving
her inability to deal with colleagues in an acceptable
fashion. 1985 Tr. at 388-89, 410.
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193 (citations omitted), precludes its application to the
constructive discharge ruling of the Court of Appeals.
E.

The Constructive Discharge Holding Is Relevant
Only As To Mitigation Of Damages And The Amount
Of Relief To Which Plaintiff Is Entitled.

Either all the remedial issues not considered by the
Supreme Court's opinion are open for reconsiderat ion d..e.
remand, or none of them are.

!l.QYQ

on

If the Court of Appeals' 1987

opinion establishes the law of the case with respect to
constructive discharge, then this Court's decision, undisturbed
on appeal, that the failure to repropose plaintiff for
partnership did not violate Title VII is also the law of the
case.
If this Court decides to accept as established both
the constructive discharge holding and the conclusion that the
OGS decision not to repropose was nondiscrimin atory, then the
Court of Appeals' constructive discharge ruling is relevant, as
plaintiff contended in the Court of Appeals, only to the issue
of "mitigation of damages, which is far different than
entitlement to relief ruu. ~."
Appellee at 17-18.

Original Br. of Appellant-Cr oss

Thus, it is simply a factor to be

considered in determining the amount of relief to which
plaintiff may be entitled .

.Id.

In fact, it is well settled that the constructive
discharge doctrine is nothing more than a specific application
in the employment context of the principles of mitigation of
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damages and "avoidable consequences."

For example, in Clark v.

Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C . Cir. 1981), accepted as still valid
by the Court of Appeals in this case, the Court of Appeals
recognized that, upon perceiving discriminatory conduct, a
"Title VII plaintiff must . . . 'mitigate damages by remaining
on the job' . . . . "

Id. at 1173 (quoting Bourgue v. Powell

Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980)).

Similarly,

in Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir.
1977), the First Circuit observed that the constructive
discharge rule inquires into the reasonableness of a
plaintiff's efforts to avoid and minimize his or her losses
after an alleged Title VII violation has occurred, and thus "is
comparable to the doctrine of avoidable consequences" under
which an "employee cannot recover damages for losses that [the
employee] could have avoided without risk of substantial loss
or injury."

.Id. at 119.

If it is the law of the case, the Court of Appeals'
holding with respect to constructive discharge stands for no
more than the simple proposition that plaintiff's resignation
from Price Waterhouse in January 1984 does not, in and of
itself, cut off plaintiff's right to seek admission as a
partner or post-resignation relief.~/

825 F.2d at 472-73.

~/ Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, Pl. Br. at 2, the Court
of Appeals did not even remotely imply that an order requiring
Price Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partner was "the
[Footnote continued on next page]
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That holdin g does not requir e the Court to ignore plain tiff's
resign ation, and the circum stance s surrou nding it, when
consid ering the total mix of inform ation conce rning her effor ts
to mitig ate any losses result ing from the 1983 hold decisi on.
Under this analy sis, plain tiff's decisi on to leave may have
been under standa ble and does not preclu de her from obtain ing
relief for some period after her resign ation. But the nature
and amoun t of her recove ry may nonet heless be inform ed by the
choice s that were availa ble to her in 1983 and 1984 and the
Court 's evalu ation of the impac t of her condu ct and decisi ons
on these choic es.

Nor would it preclu de this Court from

determ ining that while plain tiff was entitl ed to resign in
Janua ry of 1984, her failur e to be reprop osed for partne rship
consi derati on later that year had been caused by her own
condu ct in 1983.

~ ' ~ , D o r a n v. Petrol eum Manag ement

Corp, . 576 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1978) (after Court of Appea ls
·,,
revers ed distr ict court 's dismi ssal on statut ory exemp tion

'

groun ds, and reman ded, law of the case permi tted distr ict court
to dismi ss, on altern ative basis of statut e of limita tions, an
~

i/

[Footn ote contin ued from previo us page]

appro priate prosp ective relief - in this case. Rathe r, the
Court of Appea ls corre ctly assume d that this Court did not
evalu ate wheth er such relief was autho rized or appro priate due
to its holdin g that plain tiff resign ed volun tarily and was not
const ructiv ely discha rged. The Court of Appea ls' 1987 opinio
remand ed the case to this Court for a determ inatio n of that n
issue in the first instan ce. Indeed , plain tiff herse lf states
that on remand the -most seriou s discre tionar y issue on relief
is wheth er plain tiff should be admit ted to partn ership .- Pl.
Br. at 8 (emph asis added ).
~

-

\
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issue which it had not reached in the initial proceedings); see
ll..S.Q.

Maggard, 703 F.2d at 1289 (law of the case does not

preclude litigation of issues on remand that were not
previously decided "'either expressly or by necessary
implication'") (citation omitted).
Finally, even if this Court accepts the constructive
discharge holding as binding on remand and plaintiff's
resignation in January of 1984 is considered to be the
equivalent of termination by the firm, the following section of
this brief demonstrates that there were many comparable
employment positions available to plaintiff had she exercised
reasonable diligence, and her failure to obtain a comparable
position was due solely to her own lack of diligence and her
deliberate decision to eschew the alternatives and to start her
own business.
III

PLAINTIFF'S RELIEF, IF ANY,
MUST BE LIMITED TO BACK PAY FOR THE
PERIOD JULY 1, 1983 TO JUNE 30, 1984

A.

Plaintiff's Request For Partnership Admission Should
Be Denied,
As Price Waterhouse demonstrated in its previous

submissions, plaintiff's request for a judicial decree making
her a partner in the Price Waterhouse firm must be denied
because Title VII's remedial scheme provides only for
"reinstatement or hiring of employees," 42
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u.s.c

§ 2000-S(g)

(emphasis added), and does not empower courts to force
individua ls to join with one another as partners in a
professio nal business enterpris e . .l.Q./

Furthermo re, whether

plaintiff was construct ively discharge d or not, it would be
inappropr iate and inequitab le to force the partners of Price
Waterhous e to accept an individua l into the partnersh ip whose
conduct towards subordina tes was unaccepta ble and whose conduct
caused her not to be reproposed by her practice group in 1984.
A court should not force someone who manifests an
"[i]nabil ity to get along with staff or peers," 618 F. Supp.
at 1114, into a professio nal and collegial body where the
"interpers onal skills of prospectiv e partners was properly an
important part of [the firm's] written partnersh ip evaluation
criteria."

.Id.

As the Court noted during trial, it is "clear"

from the record that plaintiff had "interpers onal
difficult ies."

1990 Tr. at 251.

Under the circumsta nces, an

order requiring Price Waterhous e to admit plaintiff as a
partner could result, despite defendant 's efforts to
accommoda te plaintiff 's style, in disruptio n, friction and
antagonism , and is unfair to all the partners who were judged
by a more rigorous standard than plaintiff .
247-50.

~

1990 Tr. at

It may also be damaging to the morale of subordina tes

Def. Pre-Trial Br. on Remedial Issues at 4-7 (filed
Jan. 17, 1990). Such relief also would interfere with
associatio nal freedoms protected by the First Amendment . Id.
at 7-8. Thus, at most, plaintiff is entitled to a remedial
order requiring that she be reconsider ed for partnersh ip
without regard to her gender. _lg_. at 14.
.l.Q./
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requ i red t o work f or p l aint iff .
be denied.

~

Such relief shou l d there f ore

McIntosh v. Jones Truck Lines Inc., 767 F.2d

433 , 435 n.l (8th Cir . 1985) (affirming denial of reinstatement
based upon plaintiff's interpersonal deficiencies).ll/
The plaintiff has not cited and defendant is not aware
of a single case in which a court has issued a remedial decree
requiring the admission of an individual to a partnership.
Even if that were to be a permissible and jurisprudentially
appropriate course in some instances, this is not such a case.
Finally, because of plaintiff's conscious decision to
change career paths after she left Price Waterhouse, she has
spent her past six years professionally occupied in a manner
that is not consistent with the work she would have been doing
or would be expected to do as a partner at Price Waterhouse.

11/ Courts often refuse to order reinstatement where, due to
interpersonal tension, ·,such relief would be unworkable and
impractical. ~ ' ~ ,' Cassino v. Reichold Chemicals, 817
F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987), .c.e.tl.. denied, 108 s. Ct. 785
(1988). Moreover, high level executive and managerial
positions have been distinguished from "assembly line or
clerical" worker positI'ons to support denial of reinstatement
when the position in questio~... require[s] a close working
relationship between plaintiff and top executives of
defendant." ~ v. Kallir. Phillips Ross. Inc. 420 F. Supp.
919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion. 559 F.2d
1203 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 434 u.s. 920 (1977); ~ ~
Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA)
1309, 1321 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (rejecting reinstatement of
executive because, inter tli.a., "unlike an unskilled worker, a
person in an executive or management position must have the
complete confidence of others in management"). Similarly,
courts at common law refused to compel individuals to become
partners because of the difficulties of effectively enforcing a
decree that requires such close personal association. ~
Clark v~ Truitt. 183 Il~. 239, 55 N.E. 683, 685 (1899).
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As the former Chairman of Price Waterhouse testified, "[t]here
is no greater way to strike out in a professional firm than not
[being] capable of running your act

[Plaintiff] has

not had that experience in the last couple of years."
at 248.

1990 Tr.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is presently

qualified to fulfill the duties of a Price Waterhouse partner
and to serve the clients of the firm at the level expected of
Price Waterhouse partners.

The Court should therefore refuse

to issue a decree compelling Price Waterhouse to admit her into
the firm.
B.

Assuming Liability, Plaintiff's Monetary Relief Should
Be Limited To Back Pav For A Limited Period Following
July 1, 1983.
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief for the remainder of

her life, a 42-year period, dating from July 1, 1983 through
"her life expectancy in 2025."

Pl. Ex. A3.

She seeks back pay

for the period July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1989, and front pay in
lieu of admission as a partner for "future losses."

Sn id.

However, plaintiff misapprehends the nature of the injury she
sustained and the remedy to which she is entitled.

At most she

was denied an opportunity to advance to partner in a particular
professional firm.

She did not sustain an injury that

prevented her from obtaining comparable work.

She made some

choices that affected her marketability, but Price Waterhouse
did not permanently disable her from being a successful big
systems management consultant when it deferred her partnership
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candid acy in 1983.

Plaint iff ' s failure to mitiga te damage s,

and the specul ativen ess ~f her damage s calcul ations , require
that any moneta ry recove ry be limited to back pay for a period
beg i nning July 1, 1983 and ending not later than June 30, 1984.
Plaint iff had a "statu tory duty to minimi ze [her]
damage s" after the 1983 decisio n to defer her partne rship
candid acy.
42

u.s.c.

Ford Motor Co. v. ~ , 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982);
§ 2000e- 5(g)

(back pay awards must be reduced by

"amoun ts earnab le with reason able diligen ce" during interim
period betwee n date of discrim ination and judgme nt).

"This

duty, rooted in an ancien t princi ple of law," Ford Motor Co.,
458 U.S. at 231, require d plaint iff to act reason ably in
seeking renomi nation to partne rship at Price Waterh ouse after
her initia l candid acy was deferre d 121 and, after the decisio n

12/ As in the law of torts and contra cts, under Title VII,
plaint iffs must act reason ably to avoid the conseq uences of the
defend ant's alleged miscon duct immed iately upon perreiv ing it,
and thereby mitiga te their losses . ~ Clark v. M~____I_fill, 665
F.2d at 1173 (a "Title VII plaint iff must . . . 'mitiga te
damage s by remain ing on the job'") (cit~ti on ommitt ed). Thus,
for exampl e, a person al injury plaint iff must mitiga te damage s
by prompt ly seeking medica l treatm ent after discov ering the
injury . ~ 4 F. Harper , F. James & o. Gray, The Law of Torts
§ 25.4, at 511-16 (2d ed. 1986). ~ genera lly c. McCorm ick,
Handbo ok on the Law of Damag es§§ 33-34 (1935) . Simila rly, in
contra ct cases "after [a] plaint iff . . . receiv e[s] notice of
the breach ," the plaint iff has a "duty to do nothing to
increa se the damage s flowing therefr om." Rocking ham County v.
Luten Bridge Co,, 35 F.2d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 1929); ~ , ~ ,
Wessle r v. City of St. Louis, 242 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo. Ct. App.
1951) ("m .t.h.e breach of a contra ct of employ ment, the
employ ee is under compul sion to use reason able diligen ce to
obtain other gainfu l employ ment for the purpos e of minimi zing
[Footn ote continu ed on next page]
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not to repropose her, to "use reasonable diligence in finding
other suitable employment," i.d_., that is "substantial ly
equivalent" to the position denied her.
F. Supp. 312, 338 (D.D.C. 1988).

Hartman v. Wick, 678

Moreover, because Price

Waterhouse is a nationwide partnership that regularly asks and
expects its partners to transfer, 1990 Tr. at 239-41, and
because plaintiff has admitted she was willing to take a
position in a new location, i.d_. at 62-63, she had a duty to
seek comparable employment in the national market for persons
with her skills and experience.

~, ~,

~

v. Nicks, 741

F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1984) (because plaintiff admitted at trial
she was "willing to relocate," she had an obligatinn to accept
a position in a new location), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216
(1985); Cowen v. Standard Brands. 572 F. Supp. 1576, 1581 (N.D.
Ala. 1983) (employee who can expect to be transferred must
accept position in new city);™ .a..l..s..Q Joshi v. Florida State
University Health Center, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 656,

ll/

[Footnote continued from previous page]

the resulting damages") (emphasis added). Plaintiffs cannot
wait until they have obtained a favorable judgment that has
been affirmed on appeal to mitigate damages. Indeed, this is
precisely the result that the mitigation rule seeks to avoid,
as demonstrated by Title VII's requirement that plaintiffs
exercise reasonable diligence during the pendency of their
claims. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). In order to "retain [the] right
to compensation " pending a favorable decision, an employee must
take reasonable steps to mitigate. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at
232 n. 18. compare Cassino v. Reichold Chemicals. 817 F.2d
1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1987) (a discriminato rily discharged
"plaintiff must attempt to mitigate damages by exercising
reasonable care and diligence in seeking reemployment after
termination. ") (emphasis added).

- 27 -

658 (N . D. Fla . 1986) (plaintiff ' s limited search unreasonable
because the "physician market is a national one"), aff'd
without opinion, 845 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 836 (1989).
Price Waterhouse demonstrated through various
witnesses, and plaintiff was not able to refute, that "there
were suitable positions available and that the plaintiff failed
to use reasonable care in seeking them."
1345.

Cassino. 817 F.2d at

The job market for persons with plaintiff's skills and

experience has expanded steadily and substantiall y since 1983.
1990 Tr. at 279-81.

In 1984, there was a strong demand for

management consultants like plaintiff at Big Eight accounting
firms, large independent consulting firms, and within
companies .

.Id,

Touche Ross expressed a specific interest in

plaintiff (1990 Tr. at 179-80) and other Big Eight firms such
as Arthur Andersen and Peat Marwick and Mitchell in addition to
major management consulting firms like Booz Allen were looking
for and hiring persons with plaintiff's skills and experience
in 1984 .

.s..e..e.,

L.9...r.., i,d.

at 286; Def Ex. A7.

Aside from the

Big Eight firms, there were as many as 30-50 more firms in
which plaintiff may have marketed her talents and have found
comparable positions.

1990 Tr. at 289.

Plaintiff did not even attempt to refute the evidence
of available comparable positions.

Indeed, both plaintiff

(1990 Tr. at 37, 51-52) and her expert witness, an economist,
admitted that they made no independent investigation into the
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avai labil ity of c omp a rable po s iti ons and s i mpl y t ook the
posit ion that plain tiff's indep enden t consu lting posit ion

and

her World Bank posit ion were " the best she [coul d] do."
l_d.
at 144-4 5 . Altho ugh plain tiff has asser ted in her post -tria
l
brief that it is "high ly unlik ely " that a perso n who fails
to
make partn er at one Big Eight firm will be able to becom e
a
partn er at anoth er Big Eight firm, Pl. Br. at 9, she offer
ed no
evide nce in suppo rt of this asser tion, and it is flatl y
incon siste nt with the recor d.

~ , !L...9......, 1990 Tr. at 182,

287-8 8 .

In fact numer ous Price Water house emplo yees who have
faile d to make partn er have gone on to becom e partn ers in
other
Big Eight firms .

~ , !L...9......, Def. Ex. A7. ill

Touch e Ross was

willi ng to consi der hirin g plain tiff and putti ng her on a
partn ershi p track . 1990 Tr. at 178-8 1. But plain tiff refus

ed

to consi der such a cours e and did not even pick up the phone
to
talk to any of the other Big Eight firms .
The evide nce shows not that it was diffi cult for
someo ne leavi ng Price Water house to becom e a partn er at anoth
er
firm, but that plain tiff refus ed to consi der going to anoth
er
firm unles s she was made partn er imme diatel y. Id. at 46-47
,
179-8 0. She walke d out of the meeti ng with Touch e Ross the

ll/ The names of over thirt y such indiv idual s were place d
evide nce. As the Court noted , "with in this group of large in
r
accou nting firms perso nnel were quite fungi ble and they could
move back and forth at good money and the partn ershi p thing
just one of those thing s that even tually hit with some place is
one perso n one time, and anoth er perso n anoth er time. " 1990 ,
Tr. at 224.
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ins tan t she lear ned tha t she wou ld not
be a par tne r when she
wal ked thro ugh the doo r. Id. at 179 -80.
Aft er the 1983 hold dec isio n, pla int iff
was awa re of
"op tion s" ava ilab le to her for con sult
ing pos itio ns tha t paid
from $70 ,000 to $90 ,000 a yea r, 1985 Tr.
at 115 , com pare d with
her $70 ,000 1983 sala ry lev el at Pric e
Wat erho use. 1990 Tr. at
33.

She did not pur sue tho se opt ion s then
or afte r she
resi gne d from Pric e Wat erho use . .Id. at
34. Alth oug h pla inti ff
clai ms the Aug ust 1983 OGS dec isio n not
to repr opo se her was a
key fac tor in her dec isio n to leav e the
firm , Pl. Br. at 7, she
made no eff ort wha tsoe ver to look for
a new pos itio n prio r to
her resi gna tion fou r mon ths late r. 1990
Tr. at 33. When she
did leav e, she imm edia tely star ted her
own bus ines s. _Id.
Aft er she resi gne d, pla inti ff made vir
tua lly no
eff ort s to wor k wit h exe cuti ve rec ruit
ers . She clai ms to hav e
con tact ed no mor e than fou r in wri ting
, id. at 61, and ,
alth oug h rep rese nted in this cas e by cou
nse l at the tim e, cou ld
prod uce no wri tten evid enc e of .a.DY con
tact wit h exe cuti ve
plac eme nt firm s.

Pla inti ff star ted her own con sult ing com
pany
as soon as she lef t Pric e Wat erho use.
She the rea fter view ed
the sea rch for a new pos itio n as a "sec
ond ary set of
act ivit ies ."

_Id.

at 49.

Rem arka bly, pla inti ff did not fill out
a sing le
app lica tion or othe rwi se "for mal [ly] app
l[y] " for a con sult ing
pos itio n at any firm . 1990 Tr. at 48-4
9, 61-6 2. Sim ilar ly,
pla inti ff turn ed down an off er for a pos
itio n wit h the
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management consulting firm of Pinkerton Computer Consultants
(1990 Tr. at 50); admitted she was not interested in attaining
a position with Price Waterhouse's principal competitor in her
specialty area; and declined the offer of an accounting firm to
start a consulting practice for that firm .

.Id. at 54-56.

The simple fact is that plaintiff did virtually
nothing to find employment that compared with the position to
which she aspired at Price Waterhouse.

Although she "agree[s]

that [she] had a duty to mitigate after she left Price
Waterhouse," she contends that she fulfilled that duty when she
started her own consulting firm.

Pl. Br. at 9.

However,

plaintiff does not and cannot argue that her independent
consulting operation was "substantial ly equivalent," or even
similar to, a Price Waterhouse partnership.

It was in fact a

"new and independent undertaking, " Ford Motor Co •. 458 U.S. at
234, which plaintiff has implicitly acknowledged posed
significantly more business risks than a position similar to a
Price Waterhouse partnership or staff position.

~, ~,

Testimony of Ann B. Hopkins, 1990 Tr. at 25-26 (plaintiff
ultimately ceased independent consulting because of "the ups
and downs of workload and the cash flow" and the "overhead cost
of managing the corporation" ).

A sole proprietorsh ip could not

possibly take advantage of plaintiff's expertise and skills as
a big systems computer consultant.
Plaintiff's single minded focus in 1984 on starting
and developing her own business was evident from her
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test imo ny.

Ove r and ove r aga in she sai d tha t she
dec ide d "to
dev ote my tim e and ene rgy to dev elo
pin g a pra ctic e as a
man age men t con sul tan t on my own ."
199 0 Tr. at 15. She sho wed
mil d cur ios ity as to wha t oth er opp
ort uni ties exi ste d but , she
sai d, "my ene rgy and my tim e and my
foc us was on my own
pra ctic e." 1..d, at 19. "[T ]he bes t
cou rse of act ion , giv en my
exp erie nce and ski lls and ass ets was
to dev elo p a bus ine ss of
my own ." 1..d, at 33; see also id. at
38, 43, 49, 51.
Pri ce Wa terh ous e can not be req uire d
to "in sur e
[pl ain tiff ] aga ins t the risk s" tha t
she her sel f vol unt aril y
assu med . For d Mo tor Co, . 458 U.S .
at 234 ; .s..e..e. .ill.Q Sco tt v.
OCE Ind ust rie s. Inc ,, 536 F. Sup p.
141 , 149 (N.D . Ill . 198 2)
(pl ain tiff was ent itle d to no dam age
s for the per iod sub seq uen t
to com mit ting her sel f to an ind epe nde
nt bus ine ss •ra the r tha n
the gen era l emp loym ent ma rke t"); 5
A. Cor bin , Corbin on
Co ntr act s§ 109 5, at 518 (19 64) (if
a wro ngf ully disc har ged
emp loye e "ch oos es to eng age in [th e
emp loy ee's own] bus ine ss,
inv esti ng cap ital the rein , the risk
of gai n or los s sho uld be
[the emp loy ee's who se] dam age s sho uld
be mea sure d by the wag es
pro mis ed les s wha t [th e emp loye e] cou
ld ear n by rea son abl e
eff ort in a sim ilar pos itio n of emp
loy men t"). Pla int iff had
rea son s tha t wer e suf fic ien t for her
to sta rt her own bus ine ss
and esch ewe d eve ry oth er opp ortu nity
to wor k wit h any of Pri ce
Wa terh ous e's com pet itor s or any com
par able firm . But she
can not make suc h a cho ice and hol d
Pri ce Wa terh ous e acc oun tab le
for its fin anc ial imp lica tion s.
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Although a professio nal employee who has diligentl y
searched for a comparabl e position with an establishe d firm,
and failed, might in an extreme case be justified in starting
his or her own business in order to mitigate, that was not the
case here.

Plaintiff made no effort to seek a similar

position, despite the availabil ity of such positions .

Before

looking for any other job, she decided to devote her full time
to developin g a new business venture.

1990 Tr. at 15.

Nor does plaintiff 's position at the World Bank
constitut e a comparabl e position.

In the first place, she did

not go to work for the World Bank until 1988 when personal
reasons caused her to abandon her own business and to take a
salaried, quasi-gov ernmental position .

.l.d. at 25, 62.

Second,

not only does the World Bank differ significa ntly in substance
from a partnersh ip in a major private accounting or managemen t
consulting firm, but it does not provide similar
responsib ilities or opportun ities, because it compensat es
plaintiff on a schedule •very similar to the U.S. federal
governme nt's civil service pay system.•

1990 Tr. at 136.

As

the Court expressed during trial, •anyone with business skills
who wants to mitigate should never go to work for the
governmen t."

1990 Tr. at 138.

As the foregoing demonstra tes, plaintiff 's efforts to
find a position similar to a Price Waterhous e partnersh ip were
negligibl e and do not satisfy her duty to mitigat~.

~ ' iL..9..L,

Sangster v. United Air Lines. Inc., 633 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir.
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1980), cert. denied, 451
Prac. Cas. at 658-59.

u.s.

971 (1981); Joshi, 48 Fair Empl.

This significantl y limits her right to

any monetary recovery.

Indeed, the failure to mitigate

necessarily forecloses the availability of any front pay.

~'

~ , Dominic v. Consolidated Edison co., 822 F.2d 1249,
1257-58 (2d Cir. 1987) (failure to mitigate completely
forecloses the availability of front pay).

Accord Hansard v.

Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1470 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied. 110

s.

ct. 129 (1989); ~~Whitt lesey

v. Union Carbide Corp,, 742 F.2d 724, 727-29 (2d Cir. 1984);
Blizzard v. Newport News Redevelopmen t and Housing Authority,
635 F. Supp. 23, 26 (E.D. Va 1985) ("it would seem inequitable
to require the defendant to pay the plaintiff 'front pay'"
where plaintiff failed to mitigate).

"[F]ront pay is intended

to be temporary in nature," Cassino. 817 F.2d at 1347, and "the
plaintiff's duty to mitigate [damages] must serve as a control
on front pay damage awards."

Id.

Plaintiff's front pay calculations are also wholly
speculative and are legally insufficient to provide the factual
predicate for a front pay award.

Plaintiff's expert ~ssumed

both that she would have remained with Price Waterhouse for the
remaining 21 years until her retirement at age 60, and that she
will remain in her present World Bank position, where her
earnings are lower than they would have been at Price
Waterhouse, until the year 2004.

These assumptions are
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unfounded.1.4./ and cannot f o rm the ba s i s o f a f ront pay awar d .
~ ' .e.......g_._, Dominic v. Consolida ted Edison Co . , 652 F. Supp.

815, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y . 1986) (rejecting 52-year old plaintiff 's
request for front pay until retiremen t age because "an award of
front pay that assumes that Dominic will stay in his present
lower paying job and awards him compensat ion for the differenc e
between that job and what he would have earned at ConEd until
he reaches the age of 70 is highly speculativ e " ), aff'd, 822
F.2d 1249 , 1257-58 (2d Ci r. 1987).

Compare Davis v. Combustio n

Engineeri ng. Inc . , 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984)
(recognizi ng the uncertain ties of awarding front pay to a
41-year old employee until retiremen t); Bonura v. Chase
Manhattan Bank. N.A., 629 F. Supp. 353, 362-63 n.3 (S . D.N.Y.
1986) (rejecting requests of two plaintiff s, ages 54 and 59,
for front pay until age 70 as unduly speculati ve), aff'd, 795
F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1986) .
Similarly , although plaintiff 's expert acknowled ged
the economic "uncertai nty about the accounting industry .
as a whole," he did no independe nt investiga tion of it in
projecting the profitabi lity of Price Waterhous e in the

ll/ Plaintiff 's expert admitted that his assumptio n that
plaintiff would have remained at Price Waterhous e until age 60
was "not based on any specific informatio n." 1990 Tr. at 116.
~ li..5..Q id. at 146-48.
Plaintiff did not testify that she
would have remained with Price Waterhous e for the duration of
her career and 10 of the 47 partners in plaintiff 's class of
1983 have already left the firm. J.d. at 215. Furthermo re, the
partner attrition rate at Price Waterhous e has increased
steadily over the _ last decade. Id,
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f utu r e.

1990 Tr . a t 128 , 167 .

Hi s p r ojec ti on s of s i gnifi cant

share value increases in the near future conflict markedly with
actua l recent history .

See Def. Ex. Al8.

Furthermore, over

one-half of the undiscounted loss projected by plaintiff was
based upon her presumed participatio n in a Price Waterhouse
retirement plan, based upon speculative projections of the
firm ' s presumed profitability for the next 36 years, on the
unproven assumption that plaintiff would have stayed with the
firm until she retired at age 60.
However, due to changes in the accounting profession
in recent years, the business environment has become risky,
unpredictabl e and uncertain.

1990 Tr. at 256-61, 348-49.

Moreover, because the Price Waterhouse retirement benefits are
unvested, a partner who leaves the firm prior to age 55 is
entitled to no benefits .

.Id. at 255-56.

The benefits are also

unfunded; therefore, if the firm becomes insolvent, no benefits
are paid to retired partners.

1..d.

In any one year, the

aggregate retirement benefits that can be paid are limited to
15\ of that year ' s profits.

~Def . Ex. A2-A3.

Plaintiff's

expert failed to take any of these factors into account (1990
Tr. at 150-69) and when discounting the resulting substantial
projected future losses to present value, he used a rate of
5.8\, Pl. Ex. A3, which is far too low and amounts to sheer
guesswork given the substantial uncertaintie s in the accounting
profession mentioned above, as well as the unlimited personal
liability of partners.

~

1990 Tr. at 346-48.
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•

Pl a i ntiff' s f ron t pay me t hodo logy trea ts this case as
if it were a tort case in which the defendant's conduct has
eliminated the plaintiff's ability to perform her profession of
management consulting.

However, the 1983 decision to defer

plaintiff's partnership candidacy did nothing of the sort.

To

award plaintiff partnership earnings until "her life expectancy
in 2025" even though plaintiff had a reasonable chance to
attain a position with comparable income in 1984, and in the
face of plaintiff"s assertion that she retains the ability and
expertise to perform as a partner at any other Big Eight firm
(1990 Tr. at 75}, not only would bestow an unjust windfall on
plaintiff, but would discourage her from seeking such a
position in the future.

In short, plaintiff wants all the

benefits of a Price Waterhouse partnership for the rest of her
life with none of the work, risk, responsibilities or
uncertainties.

She wants to be "catapult[ed].

into a

better position than she would have enjoyed in the absence of
discrimination."

Ford Motor Co., 458

u.s.

at 234.

The record reflects that plaintiff could have found a
position providing earnings and opportunities comparable to a
Price Waterhouse partnership in the ten months after she was
told she would not be reproposed for partner.ill
1990 Tr. at 285, 331-32.

~, ~,

Plaintiff's monetary recovery, if

ll/ Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, Pl. Br. at 9, the
compensation levels at other major accounting and consulting
firms were and are comparable to the compensation levels at
Price Waterhouse. 1990 Tr. at 186, 194-95, 205, 268, 285-87.
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any , must theref ore be lim i ted to back pay amoun t i ng to the
differ ence betwee n plain tiff ' s actua l earnin gs and the
compe nsatio n of partn ers in the class of 1983 for a period
extend ing no later than June 30, 1984.

IV
PLAIN TIFF'S REQUEST FOR A DECREE
REGULATING THE PRICE WATERHOUSE PARTNERSHIP
IN THE FUTURE MUST BE DENIED

Assum ing the Court finds liabi lity, the Court 's decree
with respe ct to relief for plain tiff should be limite d to an
award of back pay for a one-y ear period .

Plain tiff reque sts an

injun ction again st future Title VII violat ions and,

inter

.a.l.i_g,

would requir e Price Water house to instit ute "a writte n policy "
again st sex discri minat ion in the partne r select ion proce ss
that screen s partne r evalu ations for those that appea r to be
the produ ct of sex stereo typing and discip lines partne rs who
.

make such comme nts.

"---

~Pl.P ropo sed Decree at 1-2.

Such

injun ctive relief is wholly unwar ranted , unduly intrus ive and
----must be denied .
Plain tiff conce des that Pri~e Water house has alread y
instit uted a practi ce of screen ing partne rship evalu ations to
purge those that might possib ly includ e gende r-base d comme nts.
Pl. Br. at 11; 1990 Tr. at 254-55 . Immed iately after this
Court 's decisi on, Price Water house took decisi ve steps to
"stamp . . . . out" anythi ng improp er or inapp ropria te in its

\
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partnersh ip selection process.

There is absolutel y no evidence

of any historica l or continuin g discrimin ation at the firm, and
"[a]bsent convincin g evidence [to the contrary courts] will not
find that [a] defendant continue[ s] to discrimin ate . .

"

Hartman v. Wick, 678 F. Supp. at 340.
Under these circumsta nces, it would be inappropr iate
to enter a decree that goes beyond providing back pay relief to
the individua l plaintiff in this case.

~ ' .e.........g_,_, Johnson v.

Brock, 810 F.2d 219, 225-26 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (defendan t's "past
practices [did] not suggest the callous disregard for the goals
of Title VII which necessita te injunctive relief," and "[t]he
result of this action has no doubt impressed upon the
[defendan t] its need to exercise greater care in determinin g
its employmen t policies" ; therefore , injunctiv e relief was
properly denied); Williams v. General Foods Corp •• 492 F.2d 399
(7th Cir. 1974) (given the defendant 's efforts to comply with
federal law, no injunction necessa ry);~ v. Financial
Assurance Inc,. 624 F. Supp. 686, 695 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (denying
injunctive or affirmativ e relief where there was "no indication
that defendant s have indulged in any similar discrimiri ation in
the past or that they are likely to do so in the future"). li/

ll/ Irrespecti ve of this Court's determina tion as to whether
or not partnersh ip admission is an authorized or appropria te
remedy, plaintiff 's request for a decree regulating the firm's
conduct in the future must be rejected. If the Court declines
to make plaintiff a partner, plaintiff 's other claims for

[Footnote rontinued on next page]
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CONCLUSION
If the Court finds that Price Waterhouse is liable to
plaintiff, plaintiff should recover no more than back pay for
the period July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984.
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[Footnote continued from previous page]

affirmative relief in the decree are moot. ~ -~' ~ , ~ v.
Amarillo Equity Investors. Inc., 102 F. Supp. 256, 260 {D.
Colo. 1988) (plaintiff's claim for a decree is moot absent
reinstatement). On the other hand, if the Court compels
plaintiff's admission into the partnership, Title VII does not
afford authority to regulate the resulting relationship. S.e.e.
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("the Court's opinion should not be read as
extending Title VII to . . . the relationship among partners").
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